Approved For Release 2000/08/30: CIA-RDP80R01443R000300210015-1 NSC BRIEFING 19 January 1955

COSTA RICAN REVOLT

- I. Apparent failure Costa Rican revolt

 clearly in US interest--NOT because of

 merits or demerits governments concerned,

 but because successful repetition

 "Guatemala-type" coup would be dangerous

 precedent.
- II. As to specifics in Costa Rica -
 - A. Only rebel area left is in extreme northwest.
 - 1. 500 men in area of La Cruz.
 - B. Government moving against these, with 1,400 troops (from town of Liberia northward some 30 miles).
 - 1. Government announced (18 Jan) rebels pushed back north of Santa Rosa.
 - 2. Government hopes cut rebel escape route north of La Cruz.

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- C. Rebel "air force" collapsing.
 - Transport (C-47), piloted by American Jerry Delarm, destroyed in crash landing.
 - 2. Two AT-6's returned to Nicaragua, spotted by OAS observers, after which President Somoza sheepishly "interned" them.
 - 3. Fighter (F-47) has disappeared--believed back in Guatemala.
 - 4. Thus, little threat further rebel air action.
- III. Internal support for rebels didn't develop.
 - A. Majority Costa Ricans have no love for former presidents Calderon Guardia and Picado (in whose names rebels acting), due their:
 - 1. Alliance Communists '44-48.
 - 2. Close association Somoza since '48.
 - 3. Dictatorial tendencies.

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B. Costa Ricans generally support govern-

ment.

- 1. Even followers of Ulate (opposition leader, ex-president) volunteered fight "invaders."
- Ulate, like Figueres, old enemy Calderon/Picado.
- C. No defections reported from Civil Guard, which led by men loyal to Figueres.
- IV. Revolt's end does not mean end bad blood between Costa Rica and neighbors.
 - A. Nicaraguan, Venezuelan leaders still determined eliminate Figueres. May now try assassination.
 - B. Somoza of Nicaragua himself a target for assassins. Opposition (Conservative Party) allegedly plotting against him-Figueres would be happy to help Nicaraguan plotters.

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- V. Prompt action has raised OAS prestige, although Latin "dictators" resent what they consider US "intervention."
 - A. Venezuela, Nicaragua, Dominican

 Republic may claim action was interference.
 - B. However, others--notably Uruguay,

 Ecuador--and "liberal-democratic"

 opinion throughout hemisphere

 will support OAS action.